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REGARDING RE’S REVISIONISM: NOTES ON THE DUE 
PROCESS EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Albert W. Alschuler∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
At least initially, Richard Re’s argument for grounding the exclu-
sion of unlawfully obtained evidence on the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments looks fresh and powerful.1  As 
originally understood, these clauses “require[d] that when the courts or 
the executive act to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property, they do 
so in accordance with established law.”2  Because the police do not act 
in accordance with established law when they violate the Fourth 
Amendment, deprivations of liberty may not rest on their unconstitu-
tional actions. 
Re says that his argument should appeal to “new” originalists, and 
his view that the Due Process Clauses originally required adherence to 
positive law seems correct.  His efforts to address the difficulties posed 
by this argument, however, lead him away from originalism.  In addi-
tion, he proposes unfortunate restrictions of both constitutional re-
quirements and the exclusionary remedy. 
Part I of this Response sketches the history of the term due process.  
After describing this term’s precursor in the Magna Carta, it explains 
why the appearance of the term in the Fifth Amendment initially 
meant next to nothing while its appearance in the Fourteenth 
Amendment transformed the constitutional landscape.  This Part also 
describes how the Framers reconciled the admission of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence with their view that government must obey its own 
law.  
Part II addresses Re’s argument that the two Due Process Clauses 
now require something they did not require initially — the exclusion of 
unlawfully obtained evidence.  Re observes that the government 
searches of the Framers’ era were infrequent and usually led to civil 
forfeitures.  Police searches did not become a regular part of the crimi-
nal investigative process until late in the nineteenth century. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the University of 
Chicago Law School.  I am grateful to John Stinneford and the editors of the Harvard Law Re-
view for valuable comments.    
 1 See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885 (2014). 
 2 Id. at 1907 (quoting John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 
VA. L. REV. 493, 497 (1997)) (internal quotation mark omitted).   
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Re does not explain, however, why these developments justify a 
due process exclusionary rule.  Because the Due Process Clauses do 
not distinguish civil from criminal cases, the fact that police searches 
have moved from the civil to the criminal column does not seem to 
matter.  Moreover, the changes Re describes neither undercut the 
Framers’ doctrinal reasons for rejecting the exclusionary remedy nor 
strengthen his own doctrinal reasons for endorsing it. 
Re’s argument encounters two further snags.  It is difficult to see 
how an exclusionary rule grounded on the original meaning of the Due 
Process Clauses could be limited to criminal cases, and it is equally dif-
ficult to see how such a rule could exclude only the fruits of constitu-
tional violations.  Both applying the rule in civil cases and applying it 
to the products of nonconstitutional violations would expand the rule 
in ways that currently seem unthinkable.  Re’s efforts to resolve these 
difficulties lead him away from originalism. 
Part III examines the contours of the exclusionary rule Re propos-
es.  He maintains that a focus on due process leads to two major doc-
trinal shifts, and these shifts in turn require reconsideration of a num-
ber of subordinate doctrines.  First, he says, a focus on due process 
obviates the need to consider whether a violation of law has caused 
the discovery of challenged evidence; the question instead becomes 
whether officials have exceeded their lawful authority.  Second, he 
says, due process requires exclusion only when the police have violated 
“scope rules” (rules limiting the scope of their investigative authority), 
not when they have violated “manner rules” (rules limiting the manner 
in which they exercise this authority).  
Re’s reasons for concluding that the Due Process Clauses yield the-
se doctrinal changes are obscure, but his assertions set the stage for a 
display of Langdellian legal science.  He employs the concepts of “au-
thority” and “scope” to validate virtually all of the Burger, Rehnquist, 
and Roberts Courts’ limitations of the exclusionary rule.  Indeed, Re 
would admit much unlawfully obtained evidence the current Supreme 
Court would exclude.  Part III examines Re’s proposed revisions of 
Supreme Court rulings concerning inevitable discovery, attenuation, 
good faith, the admission of evidence seized following knock-and-
announce violations, and the power of courts to try unlawfully arrested 
defendants. 
Although I have explained elsewhere why I consider the current 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “well within the bounds of legit-
imate constitutional interpretation,”3 this Response concludes by en-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment Remedies: The Current Understanding, in 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 197, 206 
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991).   
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dorsing Re’s claim that the rule can plausibly rest on the Due Process 
Clauses as well.  I briefly sketch a less conceptual due process argu-
ment than his.4 
I.  THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF DUE PROCESS 
This Part discusses what the phrases by the law of the land and due 
process of law are likely to have meant to the people who used them  
in the Magna Carta, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
A.  The Magna Carta 
In 1215, in chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, King John promised his 
barons that he would condemn no freeman “but by the lawful judg-
ment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.”5  The King thus agreed 
to abide by law, or at least to secure the approval of someone’s peers 
when he did not.  At the time, neither a right to jury trial nor a sepa-
rate legislative branch of government existed.  “Peers” meant, not ju-
rors, but equals — for a baron, other peers of the realm.  “Law” meant 
customary law.6  Re echoes Lord Chief Justice Coke, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and everyone else when he says that the phrase due process of 
law in a subsequent English statute and the U.S. Constitution ex-
pressed the same idea: a government of laws. 
B.  The Fifth Amendment 
By the time the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prom-
ised adherence to law, the promise seemed redundant.  Even without 
this clause, the federal government would have been required to obey 
federal law.  Initially, there appeared to be no reason to mention this 
clause in litigation, and almost no one did.7 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Re seeks to bolster his due process argument by dismissing efforts to ground the exclusion-
ary rule on the Fourth Amendment.  Many of his arguments on this point are unconvincing, and 
his claim that supporters of the rule have ignored issues of constitutional legitimacy is unfair.  The 
Harvard Law Review Forum’s word limits do not permit me to discuss all of Re’s article, howev-
er, and I will bypass this part. 
 5 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215).  
 6 This year marks the centenary of Professor Charles McIlwain’s impressive analysis of the 
original meaning of chapter 39.  See C. H. McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 
COLUM. L. REV. 27 (1914).  Some historians have concluded that the King promised only to in-
voke legal process before sending an army against a baron, but McIlwain’s article shows that 
chapter 39 meant more. 
 7 The two earliest reported decisions on the meaning of state constitutional provisions promis-
ing adherence to the law of the land both held that these provisions required compliance with 
current law but imposed no restraint on the power of the legislature to change law.  See Mayo v. 
Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 57 (1817) (declaring that New Hampshire’s provision “was not intended to 
abridge the power of the legislature, but to assert the right of every citizen to be secure from all 
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In 1856, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Due Pro-
cess Clause demanded more than adherence to current law.  The issue 
in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.8 was the va-
lidity of a federal statute authorizing certain procedures for recovering 
a debt.  A debtor challenging these procedures argued that the Due 
Process Clause required not only the observance of the legal re-
strictions then in effect but also of restrictions in effect at the time the 
Bill of Rights was ratified.9 
Re might call this debtor an “old” originalist (though other “old” 
originalists might not welcome his company).  He argued for “constru-
ing” the clause to do just what it would have done at the moment it 
was ratified rather than for “interpreting” the broader principle of le-
gality enacted by the Framers. 
In Murray’s Lessee, the Court embraced this brand of originalism.  
To determine whether the challenged statute violated the Due Process 
Clause, it asked first whether this statute violated any other provision 
of the Constitution (the positive law applicable to Congress) and then 
whether it was inconsistent with “those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statue [sic] law of England, be-
fore the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have 
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been act-
ed on by them after the settlement of this country.”10 
“Constitutionalizing” all the common law and English statutory law 
that Americans observed in 1791 probably was not what the Framers 
had in mind, and placing this law beyond legislative revision was a 
dreadful idea.11 
C.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment extended the due 
process requirement to the states.  At least on one view, the amend-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
arrests not warranted by law”); State, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28, 30 (1794) (accepting the attorney gen-
eral’s argument that the North Carolina provision “could not be intended as a restraint upon the 
Legislature”).  The reporter apparently styled the North Carolina decision “State” because it con-
sisted of a ruling on an ex parte motion by the attorney general. 
 8 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).  
 9 Id. at 273. 
 10 Id. at 277.   
 11 One year after Murray’s Lessee, Chief Justice Taney, writing for himself and two other Jus-
tices, propounded an even more dreadful interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (declaring that Dred Scott 
remained a slave because “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his . . . property, merely because he . . . brought his property into a particular Territory of the 
United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law”).  Justice Curtis 
offered a powerful rebuttal.  See id. at 626–28 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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ment required the states to adhere to their own procedural law.12  A 
federal constitutional guarantee of state adherence to law was not at 
all redundant, and it sparked lots of litigation. 
Constitutionalizing state law, however, was just as bad an idea as 
constitutionalizing the common law.  In Hurtado v. California13 in 
1884, the Supreme Court confronted a clash of two unfortunate inter-
pretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, both of them assertedly 
originalist. 
Several states, departing from the common law, had authorized the 
commencement of felony prosecutions by information rather than in-
dictment.  Some courts held this departure consistent with due process 
because “a prosecution by information takes from [the accused] no 
immunity or protection to which he is entitled under the law.”14  To 
these courts, due process meant “law in its regular course of admin-
istration according to the prescribed forms and in accordance with the 
general rules for the protection of individual rights.”15  They observed 
that “[a]dministration and remedial proceedings must change from 
time to time with the advancement of legal science and the progress of 
society.”16  The position of these courts looked good when a state had 
modified the common law in a sensible way, but it threatened to make 
a federal constitutional case of every alleged violation of state law.   
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a different 
view.  Interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution before the Civil 
War, it said that due process could not refer to “the law of the land at 
the time of the trial,” for such a construction would allow a legislature 
a free hand in shaping and altering law.  Safeguarding “ancient rights 
and liberties” required incorporating those portions of the common law 
that had been accepted by the American colonists.17 
In Hurtado, the Supreme Court rejected both of these competing 
views and criticized old-style originalism: 
  The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by de-
scendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of English law and 
history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a 
people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of many 
tongues. . . . There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1876) (upholding Louisiana’s denial of a jury trial to 
a defendant in a civil action and observing that “[t]his process in the States is regulated by the law 
of the State”).  The principal goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to afford the benefit of law 
to former slaves and other likely targets of discrimination. 
 13 110 U.S. 516 (1884).  
 14 Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229, 241 (1880).   
 15 Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 149 (1872).  
 16 Id.  
 17 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 342 (1857) (Shaw, C.J.); see id. at 342–43.   
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broad charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best 
ideas of all systems and of every age . . . .18 
The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause “refers to that law of the land in each State, which derives its 
authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted 
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”19 
With this decision, the Court began the task of separating funda-
mental from nonfundamental rights.  Assuming this power was una-
voidable if the clause was not to constitutionalize either all state law or 
all the received common law of England.  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
move marked the start of a roller coaster ride.  Later decisions would 
speak of shocked consciences, ordered liberty, selective incorporation, 
interest balancing, emanations of penumbras, tiers, trimesters, the ex-
clusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, and other things of which the 
Framers never dreamed. 
D.  Due Process and Exclusion 
If the Due Process Clauses require the government to adhere to law 
when it deprives people of liberty, doesn’t it follow that illegally seized 
evidence may not be used to generate convictions and prison sentenc-
es?  The Framers themselves did not draw this conclusion.  The ques-
tion of exclusion almost never arose before the last part of the nine-
teenth century, but in two, and apparently only two, reported cases 
prior to the Civil War, courts declared that they would not pause to 
consider the methods by which evidence was obtained.20 
The courts’ view of illegally seized evidence resembled the view 
they took (and still take) of unlawful arrests — a view Re endorses.  
An officer who arrests someone unlawfully and locks him in a cell de-
prives him of liberty without due process.  At the time of the framing, 
this arrestee would have had both a common law damage action 
against the officer and a specific remedy in equity for his unlawful de-
tention.  Illegal detention by an executive officer was the paradigmatic 
case for affording habeas corpus relief. 
Once a magistrate had held the arrestee for trial, however, his de-
tention would no longer be seen as unlawful.  Courts would regard it 
as resting on the magistrate’s determination rather than the officer’s 
unlawful arrest.  In the same way, after a jury had convicted the ar-
restee, his conviction and prison term would be seen as resting on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530–31.   
 19 Id. at 535.  
 20 See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843–44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 
15,551) (Story, J.); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841).  A few English cas-
es had said the same thing. 
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jury’s verdict.  The unlawful arrest might remain a but-for cause of 
the arrestee’s imprisonment, but courts would not see it as a proximate 
cause (meaning a cause they wanted to treat as a cause). 
Similarly, detention following a jury verdict would be regarded as 
resting on this verdict rather than on the seizure of even outcome-
determinative evidence.  The government was bound to obey its own 
law, but the law it was bound to obey included the law of remedies.  
The common law or a legislature might have determined that some 
remedies for unlawful seizures were appropriate and others inappro-
priate.  As long as the government applied its law of remedies uni-
formly, it afforded litigants the process they were due. 
Re maintains that the constitutional requirement of adherence to 
law now requires something it did not require in 1791 or 1868 — the 
suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
In his view, however, changed circumstances do not require revision of 
the government’s power to imprison a person seized in violation of the 
amendment.  This Response turns to his argument. 
II.  RE’S ARGUMENT FOR DUE PROCESS EXCLUSION 
This Part examines Re’s view of the relationship between the Due 
Process Clauses and the Fourth Amendment, his reasons for conclud-
ing that this relationship has changed over time, and his response to 
the objection that grounding the exclusionary rule on due process and 
the government’s obligation to obey its own law would extend the  
rule to civil cases and to the fruits of statutory as well as constitutional 
violations. 
A.  The Relationship Between the Due Process Clauses 
 and Other Parts of the Constitution 
Re says that “a Fourth Amendment violation is ‘complete’ before 
the commencement of trial” but “that the introduction of illegally ob-
tained evidence threatens a second violation — namely, the violation 
of a defendant’s right not to be deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess.”21  The Due Process Clauses thus mandate a remedy for the un-
lawful seizure of evidence that the Fourth Amendment alone would 
not require.  Excluding this evidence is necessary to prevent an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of liberty. 
Re adds that the Due Process Clauses require a specific remedy for 
other constitutional violations in the same way.  Although the Self-
Incrimination and Confrontation clauses, unlike the Fourth Amend-
ment, specify trial rights, they “are silent when it comes to the appro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Re, supra note 1, at 1917. 
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priate remedy in the event that a violation has already transpired.”22  
Moreover, the First Amendment, which begins with the words “Con-
gress shall make no law,”23 limits the power of the legislature but not 
the judiciary.  Although Congress’s enactment of the Sedition Act vio-
lated the First Amendment, the courts’ conviction and imprisonment 
of people who violated this statute did not.  Their “convictions instead 
transgressed the procedural requirement that every deprivation of lib-
erty must be authorized by a valid substantive law.  Thus, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in conjunction with the First 
Amendment, not the First Amendment alone, explains why convic-
tions under the Sedition Act should have been reversed.”24 
Re appears to suggest that, if the Framers had left the Due Process 
Clauses out of the Constitution, convictions for violating invalid stat-
utes would be permissible, and convictions on the basis of compelled 
self-incrimination and the testimony of unconfronted accusers would 
be permissible as well.  Surely, however, the courts did not need the 
Due Process Clauses to imply the existence of specific remedies (reme-
dies other than compensatory damages) for the violation of at least 
some constitutional rights. 
B.  Changed Circumstances 
Re notes that government searches in the Framers’ era were infre-
quent and, when they occurred, were not part of the criminal process.  
Seizures typically led to civil forfeitures, and professional police forces 
did not exist.  He observes, “Over time, pre-trial Fourth Amendment 
rights came to function as a critical source of pre-trial procedure for 
the lawful deprivation of liberty and became functionally analogous to 
in-trial confrontation and self-incrimination rights.”25  Today “the 
Fourth Amendment . . . serves as a source of process for the acquisi-
tion of criminal verdicts.”26 
One wonders, however, why these historical developments matter.  
Neither the Fourth, the Fifth, nor the Fourteenth Amendment draws 
any distinction between criminal and civil proceedings, and none of 
these amendments distinguishes deprivations of liberty from depriva-
tions of property.  If the two Due Process Clauses require adherence to 
positive law in criminal cases, they seem to require it for deprivations 
of liberty and property in civil cases as well.  Re fails to explain why 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 Id. at 1915. 
 23  U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 24 Re, supra note 1, at 1914 (footnote omitted). 
 25 Id. at 1927. 
 26 Id. at 1928.   
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the movement of government searches from the civil to the criminal 
column makes a difference when the same principles apply in both.27 
Moreover, the changed historical circumstances Re recites neither 
undermine the Framers’ understanding of due process nor bolster Re’s 
different understanding.  The Framers’ view was apparently that, as 
long as a jurisdiction adhered to its own law including its law of rem-
edies, it provided due process.  The greater frequency of criminal  
investigation by the police did not call this conceptual analysis into 
question.28 
Re’s view is that the Due Process Clauses forbid courts from de-
priving people of liberty on the basis of prior unconstitutional actions 
such as Congress’s approval of the Sedition Act in violation of the 
First Amendment.  The suppression of speech, however, was not a rou-
tine part of the criminal process at the time of the Sedition Act, and it 
is not a routine part of this process today.  The First Amendment has 
never moved from the civil to the criminal column.  If the Due Process 
Clauses do not allow convictions based on violations of constitutional 
provisions that do not “serve as a source of process for the acquisition 
of criminal verdicts,” the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence 
apparently should have been required from the outset. 
If it mattered, the enactment of a single criminal statute like the 
Sedition Act could be characterized as a part of the criminal process, 
and so could any search that uncovered evidence a defendant sought 
to suppress.  The search must have been a part of the criminal process 
in this defendant’s case.  Re does not explain why his inquiry is statis-
tical (how often did police searches produce evidence for use in crimi-
nal cases at various stages of history) or why a court should consider 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Other Bill of Rights provisions apply only in criminal cases, and in determining the scope of 
these provisions, it may be necessary to determine whether police investigation is “functionally” a 
part of the criminal process.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460–61 (1966) (holding that 
the constitutional requirement that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself” is “fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation”).   
 28 The history Re recites provided empirical evidence that influenced some courts to reconsid-
er their disapproval of the exclusionary remedy.  See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 
1955).  This history revealed both the unfairness and the ineffectiveness of the remedial regime 
known to the Framers, and it appeared to influence two non-originalist moves by the Warren 
Court: (1) extension of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states, see Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961); and (2) the invention of “qualified immunity” for police officers sued for 
damages, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).  One can plausibly question the legitimacy of 
both moves, but together they better protected the police from unfair liability, better safeguarded 
Fourth Amendment rights, and made criminal law enforcement more effective.  See Albert W. 
Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501–10 
(2009).  Unlike the exclusionary rule, the Warren Court’s non-originalist approval of qualified 
immunity for police officers has met with the whole-hearted approval of the Burger, Rehnquist, 
and Roberts Courts. 
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whether police investigation has aided the prosecution in cases other 
than the one before it. 
Re’s statistical inquiry in fact grows odder.  He ultimately looks not 
only to how often police searches have aided criminal prosecution but 
also to the relative frequency of police investigative searches and civil 
remedies.  If Congress were to establish “a damages regime to deter 
. . . unreasonable searches and seizures,” he writes, “the Fourth 
Amendment might no longer function primarily as a source of pre-trial 
procedure for the acquisition of evidence, but instead as a vehicle for 
tort remedies.”29  In that event, he says, the Due Process Clauses might 
not require exclusion.  Affording civil remedies more often, however, 
would not reduce the frequency with which police investigations con-
tribute to criminal prosecution.  It would not make police investigation 
less a part of the criminal process.   
Re’s conceptual argument for due process exclusion and his histori-
cal argument do not fit together.  Moreover, grounding the exclusion-
ary rule on due process and the government’s obligation to obey its 
own law appears to require a notable expansion of the rule.  The fol-
lowing sections of this Response consider whether the rule could still 
be limited to criminal cases and to evidence seized in violation of the 
Constitution. 
C.  Exclusion in Civil Cases 
Because the Due Process Clauses draw no distinction between civil 
and criminal cases, Re acknowledges that the limitation of the current 
exclusionary rule to criminal cases is “in tension” with his proposal.30  
Without taking a firm position, however, he maintains that a due pro-
cess exclusionary rule might not prevent courts from continuing to re-
ceive unlawfully seized evidence in civil cases. 
He writes, “[I]t is axiomatic that criminal process needn’t always be 
followed in civil proceedings . . . .”31  That conclusion in fact comes 
easily when courts assume the power to determine for themselves what 
process is due.  When due process consists of adherence to positive law 
including the Fourth Amendment, however, is difficult to see why the 
same respect for the Fourth Amendment isn’t required in both sorts of 
cases.  When “new originalism” leads to unattractive results, Re ap-
pears to revert to a more familiar kind of due process analysis. 
Moreover, Re’s agnosticism seems incompatible with his argument 
that changed circumstances justify a due process exclusionary rule.  
He could not plausibly maintain that (1) because the Due Process 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Re, supra note 1, at 1929 (emphasis added).  
 30 Id. at 1938.   
 31 Id. at 1939.  
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Clauses are concerned mostly with deprivations of liberty in criminal 
cases, the movement of searches from the civil to the criminal column 
mandated an exclusionary rule, and (2) because the texts of the two 
Due Process Clauses do not distinguish between civil and criminal cas-
es, exclusion is necessary in civil cases too.  Exclusion in civil cases 
would complete a circle and make the incompatibility of Re’s position 
with that of the Framers clear. 
D.  Nonconstitutional and State Law Violations 
The current limitation of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of con-
stitutional violations poses a similar dilemma.  When King John 
agreed in the Magna Carta to deprive freemen of liberty only per legem 
terrae, he did not distinguish statutory from constitutional law or local 
from federal law, for those distinctions did not exist.  Re observes that 
“substantial historical evidence indicates that the Due Process Clauses 
were originally understood to command adherence to all positive-law 
procedures for depriving persons of life, liberty, or property.”32  He 
adds, “Given that history, there is a powerful historical argument that 
suppression should be mandatory for all harmful violations of positive-
law process, including state law and federal statutory law.”33  Although 
accepting this argument would radically transform current doctrine, 
Re says, “it is fair to ask whether current doctrine is correct.”34 
Reading the U.S. Constitution to require the suppression of all evi-
dence obtained in violation of state statutes, municipal ordinances, and 
police department regulations would constitutionalize local law and 
plunge the federal courts into one of the vats of soup Hurtado avoided.  
It would effectively transform all violations of local ordinances regard-
ing, say, the search of impounded automobiles into federal constitu-
tional wrongs.  Avoiding this soup, however, would require a move 
like Hurtado’s — distinguishing some rights from others.  This move 
would again abandon originalism, authorize judicial selectivity, and 
empower judges in a way that would cause originalists to shudder. 
Re hedges a little.  He writes, “There is some evidence suggesting 
that, at least by the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, ‘due pro-
cess’ referred primarily to constitutional procedures,”35 but the only 
evidence he cites is Murray’s Lessee.36  That’s the pre–Civil War case 
in which the Supreme Court read the Due Process Clause to incorpo-
rate not only the Constitution but also all the common law and statu-
tory law of England that Americans had followed prior to ratification 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Id. at 1941.  
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 1940.  
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. at 1941 n.302. 
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of the Bill of Rights.  Murray’s Lessee stands for the opposite of the 
proposition for which Re cites it.  
Re also maintains that the Due Process clause might not require 
exclusion when a state has prescribed non-exclusionary remedies for 
state law violations.  These remedies could make government searches 
part of the “civil” process again and thereby obviate the basis for ex-
clusion.  The previous section of this Response considered that peculiar 
suggestion. 
III.  BENDING DOCTRINE 
This Part considers how the exclusionary rule Re proposes would 
operate and the reasons he gives for admitting a great deal of unlaw-
fully obtained evidence. 
A.  Causation or Authority? 
Re’s description of what the two Due Process Clauses require ap-
pears to be a moving target.  Initially he says that these clauses “de-
mand adherence to law”37 and forbid convictions “based on unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence.”38  A reasonable reader of these 
statements might assume that “law” means all law (or at least all pro-
cedural law) and that “unconstitutionally obtained evidence” means all 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  This reader also might assume 
that an exclusionary rule grounded on the Due Process Clause would 
require a causal inquiry of the sort the current exclusionary rule re-
quires: Did a violation of law cause or produce evidence that a prose-
cutor proposes to introduce? 
Later, however, Re writes, “The due process exclusionary 
rule . . . focuses . . . on the scope of the government’s lawful investiga-
tive authority.”39  If one were to assume that the government has no 
authority to violate the law, this formulation might not differ from the 
formulations that preceded it, but Re in fact proposes to admit much 
outcome-determinative evidence the police have obtained unlawfully.  
The issue, he says, is “authority, not causality.”40 
Re objects, for example, to the Supreme Court’s statement in Mur-
ray v. United States41 that it would suppress evidence seized pursuant 
to a warrant if an earlier unlawful search had prompted the police to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Id. at 1906. 
 38 Id. at 1890. 
 39 Id. at 1953. 
 40 Id. at 1952. 
 41 487 U.S. 533 (1988).   
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seek this warrant.42  He writes, “[A]ll that should have mattered was 
whether the police possessed a lawful basis for obtaining the evidence 
in question.  Again, the answer to that question was yes: the govern-
ment’s evidence was collected in full compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, including the warrant requirement.”43  Similarly, Re ap-
proves the ruling in Segura v. United States,44 which he interprets as 
declining to suppress evidence despite an “obvious causal link between 
[an] illegal entry and the later discovery of evidence.”45  (In fact, Se-
gura held that the entry was not a but-for cause of the discovery of any 
of the evidence the government presented at trial.46) 
Authority is a plastic concept, however, and Re bends it.  He posits 
a case in which an officer unlawfully stops a vehicle, learns of an out-
standing warrant for the driver’s arrest, arrests the driver, and then 
discovers incriminating evidence in a search incident to the arrest.  In 
this case, Re says that the evidence must be suppressed: 
[T]he officer learned that the car was being driven by the target of an ar-
rest warrant only by undertaking an unlawful investigative step — name-
ly, the stop.  Because the officer stepped outside the scope of her investiga-
tive authority, due process prohibited her from relying on the fruits of that 
transgression when taking new investigative steps.47  
Re’s position thus seems to be that when a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment leads the police to seek a warrant, they may act on the 
basis of the warrant they obtain.  A warrant issued on probable cause 
obliterates their earlier violation and gives them authority to search.  
When a violation of the Fourth Amendment leads the police to learn of 
an already existing warrant, however, they may not act on the basis of 
this warrant.  I do not see how these conclusions can be reconciled.48 
Re does not explain why authority rather than causality is the ap-
propriate inquiry.  He offers no evidence that the Framers favored this 
inquiry or that anyone else did either.  Moreover, Re offers no explana-
tion of what authority means or why this concept isn’t question  
begging. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See id. at 542.  The Court envisioned a situation in which the police could have obtained a 
warrant on the basis of evidence they possessed prior to an illegal search but in which they decid-
ed to search without a warrant to confirm that obtaining the warrant would be worth their effort. 
 43 Re, supra note 1, at 1958–59.    
 44 468 U.S. 796 (1984).  
 45 Re, supra note 1, at 1957–58.  
 46 Segura, 468 U.S. at 813–14. 
 47 Re, supra note 1, at 1962.   
 48 Indeed, the “existing warrant” case is the stronger case for bending or abandoning the cus-
tomary causal inquiry.  If an officer were to discover that a driver he had stopped unlawfully was 
on the FBI’s most wanted list and that a valid warrant existed for his arrest, one hopes that the 
officer would not allow the suspect to drive off.  Indeed, one would be tempted to fire the officer 
if he did.  And if the officer could appropriately arrest the suspect, he should be allowed to make 
a self-protective search incident to arrest before transporting the suspect to a lockup. 
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Re would in fact admit nearly all of the unlawfully obtained evi-
dence the Supreme Court has ruled admissible after more than four 
decades of chopping away at the exclusionary rule.  In some situations, 
he would admit more.49  Where the Court has cut back on the rule by 
approving a number of exceptions to it and by speaking of inevitable 
discovery, attenuation, and other causal concepts, Re would cut back 
primarily by speaking of “authority.”  He claims that unrecognized due 
process principles underlie nearly all of the Supreme Court’s exclu-
sionary rule decisions, and he maintains that “many basic features of 
current jurisprudence suddenly make sense” when one focuses on due 
process.50 
Re concludes that the Supreme Court nearly always has reached 
the correct results in Fourth Amendment cases and nearly always has 
given the wrong reasons for them.  He is truly a legal scientist, and 
Dean Langdell would be proud.  The following sections of this Re-
sponse examine some of his reconceptualizations. 
B.  Inevitable Discovery 
In Nix v. Williams,51 “the seminal ‘inevitable discovery’ case,”52 a 
police officer’s interrogation of a suspect in violation of his right to 
counsel led the suspect to reveal the location of his victim’s body.  The 
Supreme Court held the unlawfully recovered body admissible because 
a lawful search already underway would have led to its discovery in 
any event.  The constitutional violation was not a but-for cause of the 
body’s discovery; the discovery was inevitable. 
Re comments: 
[I]t should not matter whether the police were, in fact, likely to discover 
the evidence in question, so long as they had authority to find it. . . . [D]ue 
process is satisfied so long as the government obtained the evidence in 
question in  compliance with its investigative authority. . . .  Because po-
lice could have looked into the ditch [where the body was found] for any 
reason or no reason at all, the Court should have declined to suppress 
simply by noting that the discovery of the body invaded no privacy inter-
est whatever.53 
Re’s analysis may sound plausible on the facts of Nix v. Williams, 
but consider a case in which a murder suspect has responded to a 
threat of violence by confessing that he threw the murder weapon in a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 At the same time, Re might greatly expand the reach of the exclusionary rule by extending it 
to civil cases and by suppressing evidence obtained in violation of federal and state statutes.  See 
id. at 1938–42.   
 50 Id. at 1929.  
 51 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 52 Re, supra note 1, at 1956.    
 53 Id. at 1957.   
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river.  Assume that no search for this weapon was underway; our best 
guess is that even Sherlock Holmes, Hercule Poirot, and Nancy Drew 
never would have found it in the absence of the confession. 
Current law would suppress the weapon.  The suspect was com-
pelled to incriminate himself, and discovery of the weapon was not in-
evitable.  The privilege against self-incrimination does not “mean only 
that two steps are required instead of one.”54  Re, however, apparently 
would admit the weapon because the police could have searched  
the river for any reason and because their search invaded no privacy 
interest. 
Re does not explain why the “authority” of the police to search a 
river should trump, excuse, or launder their use of unconstitutional 
methods to “cause” the discovery of evidence.  He also does not explain 
why a focus on the Due Process Clauses should lead to this revision of 
doctrine.  The police threat of violence was a part of the pretrial crim-
inal process.  This threat did not accord with existing law or even with 
“those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions.”55  Even if the police did 
not exceed their investigative authority by searching the river, they ex-
ceeded it by making the threat. 
C.  Attenuation 
Re’s discussion of attenuation is similarly unconvincing.  In Wong 
Sun v. United States,56 the Supreme Court excluded a confession a 
suspect had made immediately after his unlawful arrest, but the Court 
admitted a confession made by another suspect three days after this 
suspect’s unlawful arrest.  Before confessing, the second suspect had 
been released on his own recognizance and had returned voluntarily to 
submit a statement.  The Court held that “the connection between the 
arrest and the statement had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint.’”57 
Re maintains that the Court’s talk of taint, attenuation, and causa-
tion was unnecessary: “[T]he voluntary confession in Wong Sun dis-
closed information the police were authorized to hear.  By contrast, the 
police had no . . . authority to learn the contents of the involuntary 
confession.”58  The Court, however, excluded the first suspect’s confes-
sion, not because it was involuntary, but because it was evidence de-
rived from an unlawful arrest.  If the confession had been involuntary, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).   
 55 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).    
 56 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 57 Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).  
 58 Re, supra note 1, at 1956.   
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the case would have been easy.  In Brown v. Illinois,59 the Court held 
that even a confession obtained following Miranda warnings — a con-
fession that plainly would have been admissible if the suspect’s arrest 
had been lawful — could not be received if it was the fruit of an im-
proper arrest.  Only a more-than-voluntary confession like that of the 
second suspect in Wong Sun qualified as an independent, intervening 
cause sufficient to purge the “taint” of the unlawful arrest. 
D.  The Good Faith Exception 
The Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule inapplicable 
when the police have searched in reasonable reliance on an invalid 
warrant, an invalid statute, or an invalid judicial decision that ap-
peared to authorize their actions.60  Re declares that “there is no ‘good 
faith’ exception to the Due Process Clauses,” but he maintains that the 
decisions approving a “good faith” exception reached the correct re-
sults.  He writes, “[T]he results obtained in [these] cases are best un-
derstood, not as the exclusionary-rule decisions they purport to be, but 
rather as displaced Fourth Amendment holdings.”61 
Re observes that the police do not violate the Fourth Amendment 
when they rely reasonably on an inaccurate tip from an informant, and 
he maintains that the police similarly do not violate the amendment 
when an invalid statute, warrant, or judicial decision leads them to a 
mistaken but reasonable legal conclusion.  “How . . . can a search be 
unreasonable if an officer reasonably believed it was appropriate?”62 
Reliance on a magistrate’s official action differs, however, from re-
liance on an informant’s tip.  A nongovernmental informant cannot 
violate the Fourth Amendment, which limits only governmental ac-
tion.  A magistrate who issues an invalid warrant, however, does vio-
late the amendment.  The Framers of the Fourth Amendment spoke to 
judges, not police officers, when they provided, “[N]o Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 422 U.S. 590 (1975).  
 60 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (invalid warrant); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340 (1987) (unconstitutional statute); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (subsequently 
overruled or narrowed judicial decision). 
 61 Re, supra note 1, at 1942.  
 62 Id. at 1944.  The Fourth Amendment’s concept of probable cause provides a built-in mis-
take-of-fact “defense” to an officer who has relied reasonably on inaccurate information in making 
a search.  As long as an informant’s tip or other evidence supplied probable cause for the search, 
the search was lawful, and whether the tip was correct does not matter.  Until the Supreme Court 
recognized a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, however, it treated mistakes of law 
differently.  The Court applied the same rule to the police that it applied to the rest of us: igno-
rance of the law is no excuse. 
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things to be seized.”63  In the “good faith” cases, the Supreme Court 
held that even when officials other than police officers have violated 
the amendment deliberately, the exclusionary rule does not apply.  This 
rule is only for cops. 
As Re suggests, the police officers involved in the “good faith” cases 
acted reasonably, but the officials who authorized their searches did 
not.  Re appropriately disparages the sort of “deterrence” analysis that 
led the Supreme Court to declare the exclusionary rule inapplicable to 
the fruits of these officials’ unlawful conduct.  If Re would apply the 
due process exclusionary rule to these improperly obtained fruits, how-
ever, he could not approve the results of the Supreme Court’s “good 
faith” decisions.  Perhaps, in this rare instance, he would suppress evi-
dence the Supreme Court would admit. 
One cannot be confident of this conclusion, however, for Re seems 
to limit his focus to the reasonableness and authority of the officer who 
personally conducted a search.  In Herring v. United States,64 an of-
ficer relied on a judicially withdrawn warrant that another officer 
should have removed from a computerized file.  The Supreme Court 
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable because “the error was the re-
sult of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.”65 
Re maintains that the Court should have found no Fourth 
Amendment violation instead: “By its terms, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits unreasonable ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’; it does not prohibit 
faulty data-entry procedures.  So the critical question . . . should have 
been whether the second action — the officer’s reliance on the com-
puter system — was ‘reasonable’ . . . .”66 
If the Fourth Amendment is unconcerned with data entry and fo-
cuses only on the reasonableness of an officer who conducts a search, a 
malicious officer who places a forged warrant in a file for the purpose 
of prompting an innocent officer to make an arrest neither violates the 
Fourth Amendment himself nor produces a violation of the amend-
ment by the innocent officer.  Once more, Re apparently would admit 
evidence the Supreme Court would exclude, for the Supreme Court 
limited its “good faith” ruling to cases of negligent error. 
Re seems to reiterate his myopic view of the Fourth Amendment 
when he acknowledges that what he calls his “revisionist reading” of 
Herring would “narrow” the Supreme Court’s decision in Whiteley v. 
Warden.67  In Whiteley, a police officer arrested a suspect on the basis 
of a radio bulletin, but the bulletin had been issued without probable 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 64 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 65 Id. at 698.   
 66 Re, supra note 1, at 1944 (footnote omitted).    
 67 401 U.S. 560 (1971); see Re, supra note 1, at 1944. 
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cause.68  The Court held that “an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be in-
sulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely 
on fellow officers to make the arrest.”69  Narrowing Whiteley as Re 
proposes apparently would allow an officer without grounds for a 
search to make this search lawful by telling another officer that 
grounds exist.  It also would allow an officer who violated the Fourth 
Amendment to launder his violation by passing the task of searching 
to another officer who would conduct the search in blissful ignorance. 
In the first of its “good faith” rulings, the Supreme Court said: “It is 
necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the of-
ficers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who 
originally obtained it or who provided information material to the 
probable-cause determination.”70  In determining whether a search vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment, it also is necessary to consider the rea-
sonableness of all of the officials whose combined actions produced the 
search.  Re’s view of the Fourth Amendment, however, would give the 
police a laundry tub. 
E.  Scope Rules and Manner Rules 
Even violations of the Fourth Amendment by the officer who him-
self conducted a search often would not lead to suppression under the 
version of the exclusionary rule Re proposes.  He draws what he calls 
a “fundamental distinction” between “scope rules” (limiting “the scope 
of the government’s investigative authority”) and “manner rules” (lim-
iting the “manner in which that authority is exercised”).  Re would not 
exclude evidence the police have obtained by violating manner rules.71 
As Re acknowledges, the distinction between scope rules and man-
ner rules is not always clear.72  He characterizes the requirement of 
probable cause for a search as a scope rule but says that one could rea-
sonably regard the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before 
searching as either sort of rule.73  On balance, Re approves of Supreme 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564–66.  
 69 Id. at 568.   
 70 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S 897, 923 n.24 (1984).   
 71 Re, supra note 1, at 1945–46.  Re cites an article of mine, commenting that I have “recently 
drawn a similar distinction between . . . ‘rules about when the police may search,’ and ‘rules 
about how a search must be conducted.’”  He repeats my observation that Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586 (2006), “‘appears largely to withdraw the exclusionary remedy when the police have 
violated’ the second of these categories.”  Re, supra note 1, at 1945 n.330 (quoting Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1756–57 (2008)).  Then Re declares, “Alschuler would flip the rules for these 
categories.”  Id.  But that’s wrong.  No one who had read the article Re cites could doubt that I 
would exclude the fruits of violations of both “scope” and “manner” rules.   
 72 Re, supra note 1, at 1949.   
 73 Id. at 1949–50.   
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Court decisions treating the warrant requirement as “defin[ing] the 
scope of the government’s investigative authority.”74  According to Re, 
rules limiting the duration of a suspect’s detention “implicate[] both 
scope and manner issues.”75  All other Fourth Amendment require-
ments appear to be manner rules.  Indeed, even the probable cause 
and warrant requirements seem to be manner rules when they limit 
seizures rather than searches. 
Re explains: “The police act within the scope of their investigative 
authority when their searches disclose only information that the gov-
ernment has authority to learn.”76  He continues:  
By contrast, police act in a constitutional manner when their searches are 
not unreasonably harmful or degrading.  So whereas scope rules limit the 
evidence that the government may lawfully obtain for later use at trial, 
manner rules impose additional constraints on the police by securing inter-
ests such as physical well-being, dignity, and property.  The Constitution 
itself reflects this dichotomy, as it separately proscribes unreasonable 
“searches,” which disclose information and evidence for trial, and “sei-
zures,” which impinge on private control over persons and property.  Be-
cause only scope rules constitute procedures for the acquisition of evi-
dence, only scope rules trigger the due process exclusionary rule.77 
According to Re, the scope/manner distinction explains why courts 
permit the prosecution of unlawfully arrested defendants: 
The bar on unreasonable seizures, including arrests, is a manner rule that 
secures control over one’s person . . . .  [A]n illegal arrest — when viewed 
apart from search principles like the doctrine of search incident to arrest 
— does not limit the scope of information available for use in evidence at 
trial.78 
In addition, Re says that the scope/manner distinction justifies the 
Supreme Court’s ruling that violations of the Fourth Amendment’s 
knock-and-announce requirement do not lead to suppression.79  Alt-
hough the knock-and-announce requirement “diminishes the risk of 
unnecessary injury to suspects’ persons, property, and dignity,” it is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 Id. at 1950.   
 75 Id. at 1949.  
 76 Re, supra note 1, at 1945–46.  One might have thought that there is no information the po-
lice lack the authority to learn if they do things right and no information they have the authority 
to learn if they do things wrong.  But Re would not endorse those propositions. 
 77 Id. at 1946 (footnotes omitted).  
 78 Id. at 1951.  The Supreme Court not only has held that a court may place an improperly 
arrested defendant on trial; it also has admitted evidence the government would not have ob-
tained in the absence of the arrest — testimony by alleged eyewitnesses identifying the defendant 
as the criminal.  See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).  Re appears to approve the re-
sult in Crews, although this decision seems inconsistent with his contention that an arrest is not a 
means of acquiring evidence.     
 79 Re, supra note 1, at 1948 (discussing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)). 
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“collateral to whether the government has legal authority to learn pri-
vate information for use as evidence at trial.”80 
Re does not explain where the scope/manner distinction comes 
from or why he draws it.  The Fourth Amendment does not indicate 
that a person’s interests in physical well-being, dignity, and property 
are less protected than his interest in informational privacy or that any 
of these interests are protected in different ways.  The amendment 
treats unlawful searches and unlawful seizures alike and does not sug-
gest that violations of the warrant and knock-and-announce require-
ments should yield different consequences. 
The Due Process Clauses similarly offer no hint of the distinction 
between scope rules and manner rules.  The paradigmatic due process 
violation is one committed by an executive officer who imprisons 
someone without ever taking him to court.  This officer diminishes the 
prisoner’s physical well-being and dignity but does not gather evi-
dence. 
When the Supreme Court held the exclusionary remedy unavailable 
for knock-and-announce violations, it maintained that the failure to 
knock did not cause the discovery of evidence; the police would have 
obtained the challenged evidence even if they had knocked.  Re, how-
ever, disclaims this sort of argument, and a lack of but-for causation 
could not explain why the prosecution of unlawfully arrested defend-
ants is permitted.  For Re, the issue is authority, not causation.  An of-
ficer who exceeds his “investigative” authority violates a scope rule; an 
officer who exceeds any other kind of authority violates a manner rule. 
Perhaps the scope/manner distinction proceeds from one of Re’s 
earlier unexplained moves.  Although the Due Process Clauses do not 
distinguish civil from criminal proceedings, Re does.  At the time of 
the Framing, the Fourth Amendment did not “serve[] as a source of 
process for the acquisition of criminal verdicts,”81 but today it does.  
Re argues that this historic development justifies excluding unlawfully 
obtained evidence the Framers would have admitted. 
But perhaps not all of the Fourth Amendment “serves as a source 
of process for the acquisition of criminal verdicts”; perhaps only its 
scope rules do.  Re says of the Supreme Court decision withdrawing 
the exclusionary remedy for knock-and-announce violations, “Hudson 
effectively held that the knock-and-announce requirement is a sub-
stantive tort principle.  It . . . diminishes the risk of unnecessary injury 
to suspects’ persons, property, and dignity.”82  When the police obtain 
a search warrant, they are part of the criminal process, but when they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 Id.    
 81 Id. at 1928. 
 82 Id. at 1948.   
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fail to knock before executing this warrant, they are, as of yore, part of 
the civil process. 
As noted, a police officer can violate the Due Process Clause with-
out gathering evidence; he can simply lock someone up.  But Re must 
agree with the conventional view that, when imprisonment follows a 
jury verdict, the defendant’s imprisonment rests on this verdict rather 
than any unlawful detention that preceded it.  Re may see the jury’s 
verdict as resting in turn on the evidence it has heard.  That is why 
only an officer who has exceeded his “investigative authority” by gath-
ering evidence improperly contributes to a post-verdict deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law. 
A jury, however, requires more than evidence to render a valid 
verdict.  For one thing, a federal jury cannot convict in the absence of 
a grand jury indictment.  Re, however, approves of a Supreme Court 
decision allowing a grand jury to use unlawfully obtained evidence to 
produce an indictment.83  The jury requires jurisdiction over the de-
fendant too, but Re says it doesn’t matter that the defendant’s pres-
ence in the courtroom was obtained by arresting him in violation of 
the Constitution. 
Re’s view brings to mind the conceptualizations that formerly led 
courts not only to place unlawfully arrested defendants on trial but al-
so to receive unlawfully seized evidence.  Re, however, apparently re-
gards a jury verdict as resting on the evidence presented in court and 
not on the fact that the defendant was there too.  His metaphysics 
elude me. 
CONCLUSION 
No one can be sure what the words due process of law meant to the 
people who put those words in the Constitution twice.  The hypothesis 
that the Framers meant to require government to adhere to its own 
law, however, is at least as plausible as any other.  As applied to the 
federal government by the Fifth Amendment, this principle initially 
seemed redundant and harmless — simply a constitutional reminder of 
the importance of even-handed administration of law. 
Following the Civil War, however, people feared with good reason 
that the states of the former Confederacy would seek to deny the bene-
fits of law to a large part of their populations.  The Framers of the 
Constitution’s second Due Process Clause might have meant to require 
the states as well as the federal government to adhere to their own 
laws. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 See id. at 1936–37 (discussing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).  
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If that was the goal of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
however, they might not have been thinking clearly.  Making a federal 
constitutional violation of every misapplication of state law that yields 
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property would obliterate the distinc-
tion between constitutional and other law and decimate American fed-
eralism.  In Hurtado v. California,84 the Supreme Court avoided the 
federalization of state law by distinguishing fundamental from non-
fundamental rights.85  This move might not have been originalist, but 
a court sometimes must presume that lawgivers were “reasonable peo-
ple pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”86 even when this pre-
sumption might be a fiction. 
The implications of a principle may become clearer with the pas-
sage of time, new experience, and greater familiarity with the principle 
itself.  The barons who forced King John to promulgate the Magna 
Carta probably had no idea that commoners would someday invoke its 
principles.  Fortunately, later generations did not insist on an “old 
originalist” interpretation of the Great Charter.  
Experience since the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments suggests a plausible basis for grounding the exclusion of unlaw-
fully obtained evidence on these amendments.  The remedial regime 
known to the Framers held even officers who searched in what today’s 
Supreme Court would call “objectively reasonable good faith” person-
ally liable in damages for their trespasses.  Common law juries as-
sessed damages with few standards, and judges sometimes encouraged 
them to return enormous awards.  On paper, this regime seemed likely 
both to treat officers unfairly and to over-deter.  Why would a rational 
officer make any search that an outlier jury conceivably might hold 
unlawful? 
Experience following the emergence of professional police forces in 
the United States revealed, however, that in practice this regime did 
not deter much at all.  An expansion of substantive criminal law in-
cluding new liquor offenses and other prohibitions of private consen-
sual conduct accompanied the growth of police forces.  For many rea-
sons, the victims of police illegality rarely sued, and they were likely to 
recover little or nothing when they did.  The targets of twentieth cen-
tury police searches did not closely resemble the pamphleteers, ship 
owners, and merchants whom government officials had targeted in the 
eighteenth century. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 110 U.S. 516 (1884).   
 85 Id. at 535–36.  
 86 See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
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By the early twentieth century, the remedies for unlawful searches 
known to the Framers appeared to be largely a dead letter.  They did 
not secure the government adherence to law that the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments were designed to secure.  In this situation, Ameri-
cans’ rejection of the exclusionary principle prior to the Civil War 
should not have blocked the exercise of judgment.87 
The argument for due process exclusion sketched above differs 
from the one offered by Richard Re.  It rests on an assessment of the 
ability of older remedies to do the job in changed circumstances, not 
on a perceived shift in legal categories.  It would yield a less crabbed 
and contorted exclusionary rule than the one Re proposes.  A focus on 
the Due Process Clauses might serve as a reminder of the importance 
the Framers attached to the government’s adherence to law, and if this 
revised focus led the Supreme Court to a less hostile view of the exclu-
sionary rule, I would cheer. 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 I agree with Re that the exclusionary rule is not a sensible instrument for “deterring” police 
misconduct if to deter means to influence through fear of punishment.  Deterrence, however, is 
not the only way to alter behavior, and the exclusionary rule has demonstrably changed police 
conduct for the better.  It is one of the law’s success stories.  See generally Albert W. Alschuler, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365 (2008).  In the 
absence of the rule, the Supreme Court and other courts would have had no opportunity even to 
articulate many of the Fourth Amendment requirements the police now observe routinely.   
